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TERRITORIAL DISPUTES BY PROXY:
THE INDIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN THE
MEGA-POLITICS OF TERRITORY
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I
INTRODUCTION
International Courts (ICs) are increasingly called to rule upon mega-political
disputes. These are legal issues concerning social, economic, and political
conflicts that create cleavages at the national and international levels across or
between societies.1 Defined as such, mega-political disputes concern issues that
divide societies, with the result that, whatever the outcome of an IC ruling on
such matters, important and sizable social or political groups will be antagonized.2
This makes the involvement of ICs in mega-political disputes extremely risky,
especially in terms of backlash. This article explores whether, and under which
conditions, ICs can serve as suitable venues for resolving mega-political
territorial disputes. It focuses on a set of specific ICs—regional economic and
human rights ICs—dealing with a specific type of mega-political disputes that we
label Territorial Disputes by Proxy (TDbP). Concisely, regional ICs deal with
TDbP when they do not directly decide on who should lawfully exercise
sovereignty over a particular territory or whether a people have the right to
independence. Instead, they are called to address specific legal questions only
indirectly related to the territorial dispute, such as the property rights of ethnic
minorities or free movement of goods within contested territories. More
specifically, the article addresses three overarching questions. Can regional ICs
avoid the mega-political nature of a dispute when they address it by proxy? What
challenges do mega-political TDbP pose for the authority of regional ICs with a
mandate in human rights and economic integration? And how can ICs contribute
to the protection of civilians during territorial conflicts?
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The first question is specifically targeted to explore which type of territorial
disputes that end up in the docket of a regional IC are actually mega-political and
whether the international courts can adjudicate on some aspects of those without
inflaming the mega-political dimensions. The adjudication of territorial disputes
is one of the archetypical functions of ICs.3 However, not all disputes concerning
territorial boundaries are automatically mega-political. More often than not, such
disputes relate to a question of the exact delimitation of maritime borders or parts
of a territory that are of interest to stakeholders but not of particular relevance
to society more widely. Territorial disputes can, however, be mega-political in at
least two ways.4 The extraordinarily polarizing character is most likely due to the
inter-state nature of the territorial dispute and the clashing national interests
surrounding the claim at a national level. But the politics may also be inflamed
because of sovereignty-driven reasons if the decisions of ICs are seen as
impinging on a state’s sovereignty.5 Sometimes, however, territorial disputes end
up involving issues related to national identity, historical narratives, and access
to resources; sometimes, they even cover cases of independence claims and of
contested statehood, where the resolution of the dispute relates to claims of
sovereignty. As a result, these disputes become central to political and public
debates at the national level, at which point they can turn into mega-political
controversies.
Our second question concerns what happens to the authority of regional ICs
when dealing with mega-political territorial disputes. It is particularly important
here to underline that these regional ICs have compulsory jurisdiction and
provide for access by private parties to initiate litigation. Moreover, even if these
ICs have the procedural possibility to hear inter-state cases, because of the
substantive limits of their formally delegated powers, cases relating to damages
for citizens or companies and violation of free trade rule form the core part of
their dockets. As a result, the international judges are likely to stick to the
narrower definition of their jurisdiction and not rule directly on the winners and
losers of the territorial dispute. Nonetheless, an IC’s adjudication may have
concrete effects on the ground, which can shift power relations, international
discourse, and recognition, as well as domestic political debates regarding the
conflict. Where an issue rises to the level of being mega-political, the regional
specialized ICs are exposed to criticism of judicial activism and political backlash,
including lack of respect for their rulings and challenges to their broader
authority to get involved. This article unpacks how these ICs adopt an
incremental, domain-specific, and arms-length approach to deal with megapolitical issues.

3. Armin Von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal
in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 49, 53–54 (2013).
4. We rely here on the three-prong typology developed in Alter and Madsen’s work. Alter &
Madsen, supra note 1, at 4.
5. Id. at 10–11 (explaining that social-cleavage mega-politics seems rarely to be the factor making
a territorial dispute extraordinary).
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The third question is about the potential role of ICs in resolving megapolitical territorial disputes. Territorial conflicts in the international arena are
multifaceted. They may involve not only clashing claims of territorial sovereignty,
but also significant economic, environmental, and social concerns. These
concerns reflect a broader understanding of security, namely the idea of human
security. Human security refers to an approach focused on “identifying and
addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and
dignity of . . . people”.6 Human security is usually foregrounded in periods of a
conflict when there is no direct violence and no risk to the lives of civilians. When
it comes to regional ICs dealing with TDbP, we posit that adjudication might lead
to a greater protection of the civilian population’s economic, political, and human
rights, even if it does not directly contribute to the resolution of the territorial
conflicts. If ICs contribute to stabilizing the situation on the ground by protecting
human security, they will have intervened, upheld the law, and contributed
directly to ameliorating the situation of the directly impacted stakeholders and
perhaps indirectly to keeping the conflict from becoming even more heated.
The empirical focus is on three regional courts that thus far have been
particularly active in adjudicating TDbP: two economic courts, the Central
American Court of Justice (CACJ) and the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU), and a human rights court, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR). These ICs were selected because they demonstrate how regional ICs
with compulsory jurisdiction and access for non-state actors to initiate litigation
may become embroiled in mega-political inter-state disputes. The remainder of
the article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a conceptual framework for
TDbP before ICs and their mega-political nature. Part III deals with commercial
and institutional TDbP before economic ICs, such as the Central American Court
of Justice (CACJ) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
Here, the analysis focuses on a number of trade and institutional issues triggered
by long-standing territorial conflicts between Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa
Rica in Central America, as well as those related to the Northern Cyprus conflict
and the territorial disputes in the EU’s Mediterranean neighborhood (Palestine
and Western Sahara). Part IV explores rights based and institutional TDbP
before human rights courts. It focuses particularly on property rights violated in
the context of contested territories, drawing on the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the cases dealing with the occupation of
Northern Cyprus by Turkey. Part V concludes the article with a discussion of the
further implications of the analysis.

6. G.A. Res. 66/290, at 1 (Sept. 10, 2012).
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II
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES BY PROXY AND THE MEGA-POLITICS OF TERRITORY
Not all territorial disputes are litigated by proxy, and not all controversies
involving contested territories are mega-political. Disputes become megapolitical before they reach an international bench, if political divisions emerge in
the societies driven by three main types of controversies—inter-state conflict,
social cleavages, or sovereignty concerns.7 Territorial disputes become political
mostly due to inter-state driven politics. When two states have competing claims
to a territory, the diplomatic and international dispute often escalates to
permeate the social and public debates.8 This can happen for national security
reasons—when the states involved are willing to use (or threaten to use) force
and military action—or when a territorial dispute is also linked to broader issues
concerning ethnic minorities who inhabit the contested territories. This
willingness to escalate violence should not be equated with active conflicts. In
2020, we saw an Azerbaijani military offensive against Armenian forces, even
though the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has been often described as dormant.
National mobilization can also occur for historical reasons, such as the case of
Bolivia litigating against Chile about access to the ocean which it had lost in 1883
after the War of the Pacific.9
There can also be economic reasons for the public to have a strong stake in
the outcome of a territorial dispute. For example, Western Sahara is a sparsely
populated territory, and the export of phosphate and fisheries are a big part of
the economy, so being able to label exports as Sahrawi, and not Moroccan
products is also a relevant cause for the local population. A territorial dispute can
also qualify as mega-political due to domestic politics that frames the issue as a
divisive line in national electoral campaigns. Such developments can mobilize at
least one of the national societies of the parties to the conflict and turn the issue
into a question of extraordinary politics. More rarely, territorial disputes can also
become mega-political due to sovereignty concerns,10 but due to the potential for
EU member states to perceive a decision on the right of separatist movements to
self-determination as a limitation of their own sovereignty. This is particularly
true of states like Spain who are dealing with separatist regions within their
official borders. In sum, the cases of territorial disputes within the ICs represent
mostly inter-state driven mega-politics, but can also represent sovereignty-driven
mega-politics, or a mixture of both.
Ruling on territorial controversies was for a long time—and to a certain
extent still is today—the province of international arbitrators and of ICs with a
global reach, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the

7. Alter & Madsen, supra note 1, at 4.
8. Id.
9. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Judgment, 2018 I.C.J.
570, 509 (Oct. 1).
10. Alter & Madsen, supra note 1, at 12.
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International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Regional economic and
human rights ICs generally do not have jurisdiction over territorial matters. They
may have jurisdiction over inter-state complaints, for instance those arising
within the scope of their regional treaties on human rights or economic
integration. This may also be the reason that existing studies on ICs and
territorial disputes have been almost entirely dedicated to global ICs and arbitral
panels. In this regard, scholars generally argue that global ICs and arbitral panels
are increasingly seized to reach a peaceful settlement of disputes relating to
territory.11 Other studies focus on ICs’ high compliance with these rulings.12 This
might suggest that ICs enjoy broad authority over territorial disputes, even over
the mega-political ones.13 Or, perhaps, that territorial disputes hardly reach the
mega-political stage, making it easy for international adjudicators to resolve
them. This article, however, argues that a limited focus on inter-state arbitral and
global courts provides only a partial view of how contemporary ICs engage the
mega-politics of territory in their practices. This is because arbitration and interstate ICs share important institutional features that may well be key to explaining
the positive findings of the above-mentioned literature, but in the end say little
about the capacity of ICs to concretely and effectively deal with the mega-politics
of territory. Global ICs and international arbitral mechanisms, in fact, lack
compulsory jurisdiction and private access, while they are strongly dependent on
the litigating states’ consent to establish their jurisdiction over a territorial
boundary dispute.
In cases of contested statehood, ICs more often revert to their advisory
jurisdiction, like the ICJ did in the cases concerning Western Sahara and Kosovo.
The ICJ has also increasingly been dealing with TDbP in cases where the
applicants relied on specific norms of international law ratified by both parties.
This has been true, for instance, in the pending case brought by Ukraine against
Russia, resulting from the occupation and territorial conflict in Eastern Ukraine,
but invoking the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing

11. See Beth A. Simmons, See You in ‘Court’? The Appeal to Quasi-Judicial Legal Processes in the
Settlement of Territorial Disputes, in A ROADMAP TO WAR: TERRITORIAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, 205 (Paul F. Diehl ed., 1999) (stating that over the past 100 years,
governments have used a legalized form of dispute resolution in over 40 cases linked to territory); see
also Beth A. Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial
Disputes, 46 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2002).
12. Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel, International Institutions and Compliance with
Agreements, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721, 734 (2007) (some authors have even argued that states have
complied with virtually every territorial dispute ruling made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)).
13. Existing studies provide several explanations for this high level of compliance with ICs’ rulings
on territorial disputes. For Allee and Huth, this occurs because ICs provide “domestic political cover”;
meaning that they constitute an avenue for state leaders that face anticipated political costs at the
national level should they attempt to settle a dispute through bilateral negotiations. Todd L. Allee &
Paul K. Huth, The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes, 23 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND
PEACE SCIENCE (2006). Simmons reaches similar conclusions arguing that international institutions are
used strategically to achieve results that cannot be realized through negotiations and domestic decision
making alone. Simmons, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2002).
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of Terrorism and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination.14 In traditional territorial boundaries cases with consent
from both parties, however, what gets exported to the international judicial realm
is a watered-down version of potentially more contentious disputes; a version that
asks international adjudicators to only grapple with the interests of governments
that have already agreed to submit such a dispute to international adjudication.15
For this reason, this article focuses on what can be called international
adjudication of TDbP. As mentioned before, TDbP occurs when regional
economic and human rights ICs with compulsory jurisdiction, private access, and
a lack of direct jurisdiction over territorial matters adjudicate economic and
human rights disputes that arise from an underlying territorial controversy. In
order to fall under the TDbP category, the actual disputes presented before the
courts must be substantively de-linked from the territorial issue per se. This
means that the litigants do not ask the ICs to actually solve the territorial dispute.
Rather, they want the courts to address certain underlying legal issues that are
only indirectly linked to a territorial dispute in the sense that they have arisen as
a consequence of a dispute over territory. Such disputes can be about the tariffs
applicable to products crossing a contested border or the property rights of
people displaced due to a territorial conflict.
This article argues that regional economic and human rights courts are well
placed to serve as fora to indirectly address territorial disputes without deciding
on the victorious party in the broader conflicts. Due to their narrowly defined
jurisdiction and stronger enforcement mechanisms, they are in a better position
to avoid harsh criticism, depending on how they concretely rule in the cases at
hand. As a result, they might have the potential to retain the image of impartiality
to the conflict while securing enforcement of their rulings relating to the
stabilization of the conflict and human security.
With this in mind, we identify three main types of mega-political TDbP often
adjudicated by economic and human rights ICs: commercial, rights-based, and
institutional. The definition depends on the type of proxy deployed before or by
the ICs to distinguish the dispute at hand from territorial mega-political disputes.
Although in reality these three ideal types may overlap, we believe it is still of
analytical value to differentiate them as they capture different aspects of the
phenomenon in question. Commercial TDbP are highly divisive economic issues
arising out of an ongoing or past territorial dispute. They create inter-state
tensions, end up marginalizing given minorities from economic privileges, or
both. This type of dispute occurs, for instance, when one state imposes
additional—often illegal—tariffs against another state that belongs to the same

14. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine
v. Russian Federation), Judgment, 2019 I.C.J., 565 (Nov. 8).
15. This is not to say that such disputes are not contentious at all. However, when framed before
arbitral panels and old-style ICs, the disputes often lose their mega-political aspect, at least in the way in
which the editors of this special issue intended.
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regional economic organization as a countermeasure for an alleged violation of
territorial boundaries with the clear intent of isolating the state in the regional
bloc. Another instance is concerned with the regulation of commerce with
extraterritorial or contested territorial entities, especially in cases in which there
is the risk of excluding ethnic or other minorities from enjoying their economic
rights. There are various types of Rights-Based TDbP, including the violation of
the right to property of certain ethnic minorities, the limitation or suspension of
the free movement of peoples or, more generally, the violation of basic rights of
the citizens inhabiting contested territories. In addition to these two categories,
we also identify a third, transversal category of TDbP, which we label Institutional
TDbP. This occurs when a territorial dispute gives rise to legal disputes before
economic and human rights ICs concerning the broader functioning,
responsibilities, and nature of the regional organizations in which the various
courts adjudicating such a dispute are entrenched. This category allows us to
grasp the consequences of IC involvement in such disputes, for instance, in terms
of their operations or power, as well as consequences of regional organizations in
the overall task of dealing with the mega-politics of territory. The following part
explores some of the most known and controversial rulings of regional economic
and human rights ICs in TDbP, how these have been received in the ICs’ sociopolitical contexts, and the strategies that the ICs in point have used to tackle
them.
III
COMMERCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TERRITORIAL DISPUTES BY PROXY IN
THE PRACTICE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC COURTS
A number of commercial and institutional TDbP have been adjudicated by
the CACJ and the CJEU, two courts that are part of regional economic regimes,
the Central American System of Integration (SICA) and the European Union
(EU), respectively. The CACJ has been particularly active in this regard, having
ruled upon several community law disputes arising out of a territorial conflict
between Nicaragua and Honduras over the maritime boundaries of the
Caribbean Sea. More recently, the CACJ also ventured into ruling upon an
environmental and community law case arising from a territorial dispute between
Nicaragua and Costa Rica on the protected area of the Rio San Juan. For its part,
the CJEU has been called upon to address issues related to the import of products
from the Turkish controlled area of Northern Cyprus into the EU and on issues
regarding the import of products from occupied territories in the EU’s
Mediterranean neighborhood. The following part presents these cases and
describes how the two ICs have dealt with them in their rulings.
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A. The Mega-Politics of Territory in the Practice of the Central American
Court of Justice
In 1999, the CACJ was called to rule upon two disputes linked to a politically
heated, long-standing dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras over the
maritime boundaries of the Caribbean Sea.16 The conflict was mega-political,
involving notable disagreements between the two countries over their territorial
and maritime boundaries, at times almost leading to military confrontations
between the two countries. The conflict was also deeply rooted in the postcolonial history of the region, dating back to the second half of the nineteenth
century.17 In 1986, Honduras and Colombia began negotiations to draft the
Lopez-Ramirez Treaty, through which they redrew the maritime boundaries in
the Caribbean Sea against the will of Nicaragua.18 Although the latter repeatedly
expressed discontent with the situation, the conflict did not escalate until 1999,
the year in which Honduras—basically overnight—ratified the Treaty.
The Nicaraguan reaction was forceful. First, Nicaragua filed a case before the
CACJ, asking it to suspend the ratification of the Treaty. The Nicaraguan
allegations were the origin of the first TDbP of the CACJ, one that can be
considered more institutional than commercial, even though it was initially
framed as a community law—and thus commercial—dispute. More specifically,
Nicaragua argued that the ratification of the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty by Honduras
violated SICA law, and that both Nicaragua and the SICA were entitled to
reparations.19 In particular, Nicaragua alleged that by ratifying the LopezRamirez Treaty, Honduras had appropriated large maritime areas and important
natural resources from the Central American region in favor of a state
(Colombia) that did not belong to the region, thereby damaging the socioeconomic development of the region, the Central American territorial
patrimony, and the Central American nationality.20 The position of Nicaragua
was that Central American community law was characterized by the principles of
progressivity and irreversibility and that, accordingly, the Central American
states’ power to conclude international treaties had to be exercised in
compatibility with the purposes of the integrationist enterprise. These, according
to Nicaragua, included the integrity of the collective regional territorial
patrimony and the solidarity between the Member States, and the Honduran
16. CACJ 25-05-29-11-1999 and 26-06-03-12-1999.
17. The conflict was initially resolved in 1904, when the dispute was submitted to the arbitration of
the King of Spain. In 1912, however, Nicaragua refused to implement the arbitration award, thus
jeopardising the already precarious state of peace between the two states. The tensions between the two
countries endured until the 1960s, when the diplomatic mediation of the Organization of American States
persuaded the two states to submit the dispute to the ICJ, which eventually decided in favour of
Honduras. See Johnny Joel Ruiz, Conflictos Territoriales Honduras Y Nicaragua,
https://www.monografias.com/trabajos96/conflictos-territoriales-hondura-y-nicaragua/conflictosterritoriales-hondura-y-nicaragua.shtml [https://perma.cc/E4EF-H447].
18. Christian Diemer and Amalija Šeparovi , Territorial Questions and Maritime Delimitation with
Regard to Nicaragua’s Claims to the San Andrés Archipelago, 66 Heidelb. J. Int. Law 168 (2006).
19. CACJ 25-05-29-11-1999, at I and VIII.
20. Id. at VIII.
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decision to cede parts of its territory to Colombia therefore violated these basic
principles of the Central American integration.21 The institutional implications of
the disputes can also be grasped from the fact that even the Central American
regional Parliament (the PARLACEN) pronounced itself on the matter,
soliciting Honduras to not proceed to the approval and ratification of the LopezRamirez Treaty.22
Despite the heated protests of the Honduran government, the CACJ declared
itself to have jurisdiction to hear the case, basing its conclusion on a disposition
of the Preamble to its Statute, which explicitly attributes to the Court the role of
transforming the Central American isthmus into a unified and pacified nation.23
In this early stage, the CACJ also released a precautionary measure to stall the
ratification of the Treaty. The implementation of such a measure was, however,
officially rejected by Honduras by means of a note sent from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to the CACJ.24 As to the merits of the case, the Court ruled that
the SICA was not a mere economic community, it being, among other things,
tasked to: “[r]eaffirm and consolidate the Central American selfdetermination,”25 and “promote, in an harmonic and equilibrated way, the
economic, social, cultural, and political development of the Member States and
of the region.”26 In other words, the Court sought to overcome the limitations of
its formally delegated jurisdiction by providing a teleological interpretation of
the SICA founding Treaties that would expand its role as international
adjudicator. Accordingly, the CACJ—with the significant dissenting opinions of
the two Honduran judges27—ruled that the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty infringed
upon the principles and obligations of SICA law and that Honduras was
responsible for the violations.28
A second, mega-political TDbP linked to the same Nicaraguan-Honduran
conflict was filed by Honduras. This dispute originated from when, in response
to the ratification of the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty, Nicaragua had imposed
additional taxes on Honduran and Colombian import goods, and suspended all
commercial activities with Honduras; all behaviors that Honduras deemed in
violation of SICA law.29 In this case, the CACJ ruled that the Treaties of the
Central American economic integration obliged the SICA Member States to
respect free commerce between the Members of the Community and to treat the
goods coming from other SICA Member States as though they were national

21. Id. at L letter p and q.
22. Id. at VIII letter a.
23. Id. at considerando IX.
24. Id. at VIII.
25. Id. at Art. II(f).
26. Id. at Art. III(h).
27. CACJ 25-05-29-11-1999 (dissenting opinions of Justice Adolfo Leon Gomez and of Justice
Eduardo Gauggel Rivas).
28. Id. at resuelve I, II, and III.
29. CACJ 26-05-29-11-1999, at resulta I and II.

CASERTA & CEBULAK (DO NOT DELETE)

1/13/2022 1:25 PM

132

[Vol. 84: 123

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

goods.30 Accordingly, the CACJ declared that the Nicaraguan law imposing
additional taxes on Honduran goods constituted a violation of SICA law and, as
such, needed to be suspended.31
Finally, in 2011 the CACJ got involved in another mega-political TDbP. This
time, it was linked to a dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua concerning
the protected natural area of the Rio San Juan. The mega-political nature of this
case is revealed by the long history prior to the 2011 case. This case is directly
linked to the century-old construction of the Panama Canal by the United States
and to the Nicaraguan alternative project of dredging a second inter-oceanic
canal in the area; a project that has been recently resurrected by the new
Sandinista populist government in power in Nicaragua. Interestingly, a similar
case was already decided by the first incarnation of the CACJ in 1917.32 That
older case between Costa Rica and Nicaragua concerned the validity of the
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty by means of which Nicaragua—at that time an
American protectorate—had granted to the United States the exclusive right to
build an inter-oceanic canal in the Rio San Juan area. This case was presented
jointly with another one filed by El Salvador before the same Court, in which the
validity of the same Bryan-Chamorro Treaty was challenged for the part in which
it had granted the United States the right to build a naval base in the Gulf of
Fonseca.33 In the two rulings, the Court sided with both Costa Rica and El
Salvador, arguing that the alienation of the regional territory to a foreign entity
disturbed the “transcendental interest” of the region’s unity.34
In 2011, the CACJ dealt with issues strikingly similar to those dealt with by
the first CACJ about a hundred years earlier. In the early 2000s, in fact,
Nicaragua had initiated operations to dredge 33 kilometers of the San Juan River
to build a new inter-oceanic canal in the area. In response, Costa Rica started
constructing a highway in the contested area and sent several police officers to
protect its borders, as did Nicaragua. Costa Rica then brought Nicaragua before
the ICJ, alleging that the Nicaraguan military activities in the area constituted an
occupation and misuse of Costa Rican territory.35 Costa Rica also filed a request
for provisional measures including the withdrawal of all Nicaraguan troops from
the area, and the cessation of the construction of a canal across Costa Rican
territory.36 In 2011, the ICJ provisionally ruled that both Costa Rica and
30. Id. at considerando X and XI.
31. Id. at resuelve I and II.
32. The first CACJ was established under the auspices of the United States by the Treaty of
Washington in 1907. The first CACJ remained active until 1918, when the Court was declared expired
under its initial sunset clause. Freya Baetens, First to Rise and First to Fall: The Court of Cartago (1907–
1918), in EXPERIMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS (I. de la Rasilla
& Viñuales J.E. eds., 2019).
33. CARLOS JOSE GUTIERREZ G., LA CORTE DE CARTAGO (Jorge Ramon Hernandez Alcerro ed.,
Corte Centroamericana de Justicia. 2009).
34. Id. at 115 & ss.
35. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Submitted by the Republic of Costa
Rica, 2010 I.C.J. (November 18).
36. Id.
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Nicaragua must refrain from sending or maintaining the presence of civilians,
security forces, or police officers in this disputed border area. It added, however,
that the Nicaraguan dredging of the designated section of the San Juan River was
permitted since it was occurring in an area under Nicaraguan sovereignty.37
In this already tense situation, two environmental NGOs—FONARE and the
Nicaraguan Foundation for Sustainable Development—filed a case against Costa
Rica at the CACJ. The NGOs asked the CACJ to stop Costa Rica from
constructing a highway in the protected area of the Rio San Juan because the
project arguably violated Central American legislation on the protection of the
environment.38 The fact that the case was against Costa Rica added an additional
layer of complexity and tension as, for a long time, Costa Rica had refused to be
submitted to the jurisdiction of the CACJ on the grounds that it had not ratified
the Statute of the Court.39 In its decision, the CACJ initially declared itself
competent to rule against Costa Rica regardless of whether that state had failed
to fully ratify the Court’s Statute.40 As to the merits of the case, the CACJ, after
visiting the area of the Rio San Juan to examine the concrete effects of the
construction of the highway on the ecosystem of the protected area of the Rio
San Juan, condemned Costa Rica for the damages to the environment that was
protected by several international and regional Treaties of which Costa Rica was
a signatory.
The societal and political responses to the TDbP cases of the CACJ are
interlocutory at best. Ultimately, it could be argued that the Court’s interventions
exacerbated the conflicts, rather than channeling them toward a solution. As to
the cases between Honduras and Nicaragua, the former refused to implement the
precautionary measure dictated by the CACJ, and even bolstered its commercial
relationship with Colombia in order to compensate for Nicaragua’s economic
countermeasures.41 After the judgments, Honduras also suspended their
contributions to the payment of judges’ wages as a sign of discontent with the
Court’s activity.42 Furthermore, as mentioned above, during and after the CACJ’s
rulings, the two states moved troops to their respective borders in preparation for
military actions, with Honduras going so far as to declare a state of alert.43
According to several commentators, the whole Central American integration
project was in peril at this time, and the CACJ’s intervention did not lessen the
tension.44 Only the diplomatic mediation of the Organization of American States

37. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua),
Provisional Measures, Order, 2011 I.C.J. 6 (March 8).
38. CACJ 12-06-12-2011.
39. For a detailed discussion of the CACJ’s incomplete institutionalization, see SALVATORE
CASERTA, INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOUNDATIONS AND
AUTHORITY (Oxford University Press, 2020).
40. CACJ 12-06-12-2011, at considerando IV.
41. Augusto Zamora, Conflicto Honduras-Nicaragua: Claves Necesarias Envío (2000).
42. CASERTA, supra note 39, at 203.
43. CACJ 26-05-29-11-1999, at considerando VI.
44. See generally Zamora, supra note 41.

CASERTA & CEBULAK (DO NOT DELETE)

1/13/2022 1:25 PM

134

[Vol. 84: 123

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

proved to be decisive in decreasing tensions and, after several diplomatic
meetings in Miami, Washington, and El Salvador, the border zone was
demilitarized.45
The case against Costa Rica also had a limited impact on the ground.
Although the Government of Nicaragua openly claimed an incontestable
victory,46 the Costa Rican Government officially rejected the implementation of
the Court’s ruling and denounced the judges’ alleged partiality in favor of
Nicaragua.47 As a consequence of the ruling, the sitting Costa Rican President of
the Republic—Laura Chinchilla—suspended her participation in the Meetings of
the Heads of Government of the SICA, expressing in an official note that the
decision of the CACJ over the Rio San Juan controversy was subordinated to the
interests of Nicaragua, from a Court located in Nicaragua and with a Nicaraguan
president.48
There are many reasons for the CACJ’s struggle to handle these TDbP
meaningfully and effectively, ranging from the nature of national politics of many
of the Court’s Member States, the controversies linked to the Court’s actual
jurisdiction over such disputes, the lack of substantial legal mobilization around
the Court, and other similar contextual socio-political issues. This article,
however, looks more directly to the Court’s framing of the disputes in the rulings
and considers whether such framing has had an impact on the Court’s capacity to
deal with the mega-politics of territory. Particularly important is the fact that,
although all these cases were brought to the Court as commercial or community
law cases, or both, the Court has often, and rather boldly, used these decisions to
expand its judicial outreach to the actual underlying territorial dispute. This is
evident especially in those institutional statements of the CACJ, which
repeatedly argued that the SICA is not just a mere economic community and that
the main task of the Court is to pacify and democratize the region through judicial
means. In other words, in deciding its TDbP, the CACJ has refrained from
bringing them into the realm of economic community law and has directly
engaged with the underlying mega-political nature of the territorial disputes at
hand. Perhaps one could argue that this approach was inevitable due to the
institutional and political setting in which the Court is entrenched. Yet, a more
nuanced, balanced, commercial, and rights-oriented approach would have
enabled the Court to avoid the widespread criticism it received in the aftermath
of its involvement in TDbP, as demonstrated by the CJEU’s experience discussed
in the next sub-part.

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Corte Centroamericana condena a Costa Rica por daños a río San Juan, LA NACIÓN (July 2,
2012),
http://www.nacion.com/archivo/Corte-Centroamericana-Costa-Rica-Juan_0_1278272475.html
[https://perma.cc/HQD8-4KS2].
48. Costa Rica se distanciará del SICA después de sentencia de Corte Centroamericana, EL FARO
(July 4, 2012), http://www.elfaro.net/es/201207/internacionales/9024/ [https://perma.cc/FFX9-DCA8].
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B. Commercial and Institutional Territorial Disputes by Proxy in the Practice of
the Court of Justice of the European Union
The CJEU has only extremely rarely dealt with cases in which two states face
each other as parties.49 The majority of the CJEU’s case-law, in fact, arises
through the preliminary ruling procedure, triggered by private actors and
referred to the CJEU by national courts.50 National courts can, however, only
refer questions which are relevant to a case pending before them. Hypothetical
questions are not admissible. As a result, the framing of the cases tends to be
narrow and deal only incidentally with the territorial disputes in the EU and its
neighborhood.
Only one inter-state case before the CJEU has dealt directly with a maritime
boundary dispute. In 2018, Slovenia brought a case against Croatia, asking the
CJEU to use EU law to force Croatia into compliance with a contested
arbitration decision issued within the framework of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.51 In its defense, Slovenia relied both on general objectives of EU law
related to guaranteeing peace and the rule of law, and on economic cooperation
rules, especially those concerning the EU fisheries policy.52 In its ruling, the
CJEU concluded that deciding territorial disputes and determining the
boundaries of territories of EU member states was beyond the scope of EU law.
Advocate General Pikamäe referred to the fact that the EU’s territory is only
indirectly determined, by the territory of its member states. He highlighted that
the EU’s territory is “an objective fact that [the EU] has to accept.”53 The CJEU
aligned with this opinion and decided that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the
action brought by Slovenia.54 The lack of express jurisdiction on territorial
disputes puts the CJEU in a different position than the old-style international
courts that were expressly foreseen to adjudicate such cases.
This, however, did not prevent the Court’s involvement in a number of megapolitical TDbP. In particular, the procedural arrangements, the lack of express
jurisdiction on EU’s territorial boundaries, and the CJEU’s commitment to
further supranational integration in the EU55 made the CJEU particularly likely
to deal with TDbP. This sub-part focuses on two cases, one located officially
within the borders of the EU—the Northern Cyprus case—and the other in its

49. Graham Butler, The Court of Justice as an Inter-State Court, Y.B. OF EUR. L. 179, 179–80 (2017).
50. See Allan Rosas, The Interaction Between the European Court of Justice and National Courts in
Preliminary Ruling Proceedings: Some Institutional and Procedural Observations, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND LITIGATION: A LOOK INTO PROCEDURE 621–23 (Hélène Ruiz Fabri ed. 2019) (discussing
how the ECJ has recently emphasized the obligation of national courts to follow the preliminary ruling
procedure and treat such rules “as a normative act binding also on the national courts”).
51. Case C-457/18, Slovenia v. Croatia, 2020.
52. Id. at ¶ 1.
53. Case C-457/18, Slovenia v. Croatia, 2019, ¶ 111.
54. Case C-457/18, supra note 51, at ¶ 108.
55. RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INTEGRATION 78–79 (1998).

CASERTA & CEBULAK (DO NOT DELETE)

1/13/2022 1:25 PM

136

[Vol. 84: 123

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

southern neighborhood—the Western Sahara case.56 Both cases illustrate what
factors can be crucial in balancing the mega-political nature of a territorial
dispute with commercial questions of import and labelling of products in the EU
internal market.
The Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004 with an ongoing
territorial dispute about the northern part of the island.57 Formally, the whole
island joined the EU. But a territorial exception was put in place for the territory
of Northern Cyprus, controlled by Turkey.58 This means that EU Treaties do not
apply to the northern Cypriot territory, but only to its population. According to
the so-called Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus, the application of EU law shall be
suspended in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of
the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.59 This situation gave
rise to a number of cases before the CJEU, concerned either with the import of
products or the recognition of judgments from Northern Cyprus. The series of
three Anastasiou cases dealt with the status of products stemming from Northern
Cyprus.60
In Anastasiou (1994) a British court asked the CJEU whether goods
originating in the northern part of Cyprus were excluded from the preferential
treatment granted by the 1972 Agreement establishing an association between
the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cyprus. In this case,
the CJEU ruled that these goods were indeed excluded and, accordingly, did not
award the authorities from southern Cyprus the competence to issue certificates
for products from the northern part.61 Scholars have criticized the CJEU for
establishing a de facto embargo on Northern Cyprus as well as for being
inconsistent in its approach towards produce imported from territories occupied
by Turkey as opposed to goods from the Palestinian territories occupied by
Israel.62 The Anastasiou cases are an example of how the CJEU adopted a

56. A similar line of case law was developed in the context of the Palestinian territories. Case C386/08, Firma Brita GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, 2010; Case C-363/18, Organisation juive
européenne and Vignoble Psagot Ltd v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances, 2019.
57. For context on the conflict, see generally DIVIDED CYPRUS: MODERNITY, HISTORY, AND AN
ISLAND IN CONFLICT (Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis & Gisela Welz eds., 2006).
58. Id.
59. Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus to the Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Czech
Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of
Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is
Founded, 2003 O.J. (L 236) 955.
60. Case C-432/92, The Queen v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou
(Pissouri) Ltd. and others, 1994; Case C-219/98, Regina v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food, ex parte
S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd. and others, 2000; Case C-140/02, Regina on the application of S.P.
Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and others v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food, 2003.
61. Case C-432/92, Anastasiou, 1994, ¶ 42.
62. Stefan Talmon, The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice, 12(4) EUR. J. OF
INT’L L. 727 (2001); Pieter Jan Kuijper, Case C-386/08, Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen
Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 25 February 2010, LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION
250 (2010).
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complex and legally technical reasoning, while avoiding the mega-politics
dispute, when dealing with commercial TDbP.63 This approach is perhaps best
revealed by the fact that, in deciding these cases, the Court relied on one of the
exceptions to the recognition of export certificates as part of a system of mutual
recognition instituted by an international agreement of the EU. This applies to
situations in which, if certain authorities are not capable of ensuring the
functioning of “administrative cooperation”, non-recognition of export
certificates seemed justified,64 and this was the case in Northern Cyprus.
Another instance in which the CJEU had to indirectly touch upon the Cypriot
dispute is the Apostolides case decided in 2009.65 This case concerned the
enforcement of a judgment rendered by a Cypriot court about property in
Northern Cyprus before British courts. In this preliminary ruling procedure, the
CJEU was asked to decide whether EU Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters applied to judgments issued by a Cypriot court sitting in the
government-controlled area, which concerned land situated in the northern area.
The CJEU relied on one of the most conservative and least controversial
techniques of legal interpretation. Following a literal interpretation of Art.1 of
Protocol 10, the CJEU ruled that EU legislation applied to decisions of Cypriot
courts based in the south of the island, even if those decisions concerned the
territories in the northern part.66 The Court also emphasized that, in principle,
EU law applied to the whole territory of an acceding Member State and that
exceptions to that rule have to be interpreted narrowly.67 Further, the CJEU
stated that the judgment could be enforceable in the UK, even if, in practice,
there might be serious obstacles to enforcing it in the northern Cypriot territories.
The Court clearly drew a distinction between the practicalities on the ground and
the de jure situation by stating that “Regulation No 44/2001 merely regulates the
procedure for obtaining an order for the enforcement of foreign enforceable
instruments and does not deal with execution itself.”68
From the above it emerges that the CJEU deliberately decided to not address
the political context of the Cyprus dispute. Moreover, the Court neither referred
to the UN Security Council Resolutions nor to the judgments of the ECtHR on
that matter. As commentators put it, the Court “looked studiously the other way,
framing the dispute in as dispassionately legal terms as possible.”69 This highlights
not only the Court’s self-contained understanding of EU law, but also its lack of
63. Kuijper, supra note 62, at 250.
64. Opinion of AG Bot, Case C-386/08, Firma Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, 2009,
I-1305.
65. Case C-420/07, Meletis Apostolides v. David Charles Orams & Linda Elizabeth Orams, 2009.
66. Id. at ¶ 37.
67. Id. at ¶¶ 33–34.
68. Id. at ¶ 69.
69. Geert De Baere, Case C-420/07, Meletis Apostolides v. David Charles Orams, Linda Elizabeth
Orams, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 28 April 2009, [2009] ECR I-3571, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1123 (2010).
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direct involvement in territorial disputes. Although the CJEU avoided the megapolitical nature of the dispute, its rulings about exporting products from Northern
Cyprus into the EU have had significant effects for economic realities and the
welfare of the civilian population in the region. The comparisons with other
internationally contested territories show that the CJEU’s rulings are also
considered as an indirect political message of support (or lack thereof) for the
independence struggles concerned.70
A second case study concerns the CJEU adjudication regarding the import of
products from occupied territories in the EU’s Mediterranean neighborhood.
Within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships (Euromed), the EU has concluded
Association Agreements with several partners—the Palestinian Authority
(1997), Tunisia (1998), Morocco (2000), Israel (2000), Egypt (2004), Algeria
(2005), and Lebanon (2006). However, no such agreement exists with the
authorities of Western Sahara. The territorial disputes in the EU’s
Mediterranean neighborhood arose before the CJEU in the context of the import
of products from occupied territories into the EU.
In the landmark case Brita (2010), a controversy arose around the treatment
of products originating in Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East
Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights—areas that have been placed under Israeli
administration since 1967.71 Israeli authorities issued a movement certificate for
home water-carbonators. Although the products were produced in the West
Bank, the certificates attested to the Israeli origin of these products. Upon import
to the EU, the German authorities refused to acknowledge this origin as a basis
for entitlement to preferential treatment under the EU-Israel Agreement. The
company Brita challenged this decision in German courts and eventually
obtained a preliminary ruling referring the case to the CJEU.
In this case, the CJEU had to decide whether the EU-Israel Agreement or
the EU-Palestinian Authority Agreement would be applicable to products
originating in the occupied territories.72 As both Agreements provide for the
same preferential treatment, the national judges could have also just decided not
to apply tariffs to the products in question, without specifying which Agreement
to apply.73 This would have allowed the CJEU to avoid a politically controversial
topic of delimitation between the scopes of the EU-Israel Agreement and the
EU-Palestinian Authority Agreement. The CJEU, however, did not choose this
70. THE LEGALITY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: INTERNATIONAL, EU
LAW AND BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES (Antoine Duval and Eva Kassoti eds.,
Routledge Research in International Economic Law, pub. 2020); François Dubuisson and Ghislain
Poissonnier, Sahara occidental : Entre la diplomatie agressive de Donald Trump et celle, plus policée, de
l’Union européenne, la différence n’est pas aussi grande, LE MONDE (Dec. 28, 2020),
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/12/28/sahara-occidental-entre-la-diplomatie-agressive-dedonald-trump-et-celle-plus-policee-de-l-union-europeenne-la-difference-n-est-pas-aussigrande_6064655_3232.html.
71. For more recent rulings on the topic, see, e.g., Case C-363/18, Organisation Juive Européenne &
Vignoble Psagot Ltd v. Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances, 2019.
72. Opinion of AG Bot, supra note 64, at ¶ 5.
73. Id. at ¶¶ 105–06.
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path.74 This shows that, within its technical limits of jurisdiction, the CJEU does
not shy away from addressing the effects of occupation on the economic rights of
the civilian population.
The CJEU ruled that products from the West Bank fall outside of the scope
of application of the EU-Israel Agreement.75 Advocate General Bot submitted
that choosing the “pragmatic” solution would have the consequence of practically
voiding the EU-Palestinian Authorities Agreement.76 Both the Advocate
General and the CJEU relied upon the aims pursued by the external action of
the EU vis-à-vis the PLO in order to determine the importance of the EU-PLO
Agreement. AG refers to Art. 1 of the EU-PLO Agreement, which states its
objectives.77 It shall inter alia contribute to “social and economic development of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to encourage regional cooperation with a view
to the consolidation of peaceful coexistence and economic and political
stability”.78 He also relied on a communication by the Commission stating that
the EU-PLO Agreement is supposed to rectify the “anomaly” which means that
the occupied territories do not enjoy the same preferential treatment for their
goods as their neighboring states.79 In its judgment, the Court even expressly
stated the EU’s (Commission’s) position with regard to the goods stemming from
the occupied territories:
The European Union takes the view that products obtained in locations which have
been placed under Israeli administration since 1967 do not qualify for the preferential
treatment provided for under that agreement.80

This approach shows that the Court can harvest political support for its rulings
already at the moment of their issuing.
Similar issues arose in the cases concerning products from Western Sahara—
a non-self-governing territory occupied by Morocco. The EU–Morocco
Association Agreement has been de facto applied to products imported from
Western Sahara. Representatives of Western Sahara have brought several cases
to the CJEU challenging this practice.81 In December 2016, the Court ruled that
the EU-Morocco Association Agreement was not applicable to Western Sahara,
and hence denied Front Polisario (recognized as representatives of Western
Sahara) standing to bring an annulment case. In this decision, the CJEU relied
on its own interpretation of international law to determine that the Moroccan
occupation is not in conformity with the principle of self-determination.82 This
74. CJEU, C-386/08, Brita, 25.02.2010, ¶ 53.
75. Id.
76. Opinion of AG Bot, C-386/08, Brita, 20.10.2009, ¶ 125.
77. Id. at ¶ 123.
78. Id.
79. Id. at ¶124.
80. Brita, supra note 76, at ¶64.
81. See Case T-512/12, Front Polisaro v. Council, 2015; Case C-104/16, Council v. Front Polisaro,
2016; Case C-266/16 Western Sahara Campaign UK v. Comm’rs for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
& Sec’y of State for Env’t, Food, and Rural Affs.
82. Jed Odermatt, Council of the European Union v. Front Populaire Pour La Libération De La
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reasoning, however, presumes that the EU could have not violated international
law, and therefore that Front Polisario could not be concerned by the EUMorocco Agreement. In February 2018, the Court repeated this interpretation of
the scope of application of the agreement in a case concerning the import of
products to the UK. It also admitted that it could review the legality of an
international agreement in the course of a preliminary ruling procedure.
Contrary to Brita (2010), the rulings regarding Western Sahara were not in
line with the political will of the majority of the EU member states in the Council
who wished to apply the economic cooperation with Morocco also to the territory
of Western Sahara. On March 3rd, 2019, the Council concluded a new
Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) that expressly foresees
application to the waters of Western Sahara.83 The new SFPA could be
considered as a challenge to the authority of the CJEU’s rulings on the issue. The
understanding of the CJEU’s approach to the matter of importing products from
Western Sahara by the Commission and the Council seems rather instrumental.
The new agreement clarified the intention that it should apply to the waters of
Western Sahara. Clearly, the Council does not perceive the application of a
preferential tariff regime to products from Western Sahara as a violation of
international law nor as a de facto recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over
Western Sahara. The General Court, which in this case serves as a first-instance
EU court, has decided to annul the SFPA as the Council has infringed the
obligation to comply with the case-law of the CJEU concerning the rules of
international law applicable to the agreements at issue.84 The case will be
appealed to the CJEU. Following the judgment, the EU and Morocco issued a
joint statement emphasizing that they “will take the necessary measures to ensure
the legal framework which guarantees the continuity and stability of trade
relations between” them.85 This potential stand-off between the CJEU and the
EU’s political institutions illustrates the mega-political nature of this TDbP.
When analyzing the impact of the framing adopted by the CJEU when
dealing with these commercial TDbP, this analysis so far has shown that decisions
were largely determined by the scope of jurisdiction assigned in EU law. The
CJEU has been careful in staying within the narrowly defined limits of its
Saguia-El-Hamra Et Du Rio De Oro (Front Polisario), 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 731, 735 (2017).
83. EU-Morocco: Council Adopts Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement, COUNCIL OF THE
EU PRESS RELEASE, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/04/eu-moroccocouncil-adopts-sustainable-fisheries-partnership-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/2GHZ-7CM6] (Mar. 4,
2019). See also Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement
Between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, Council of the European Union (Nov. 27,
2018) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14367-2018-INIT/en/pdf.
84. Case T-279/19, Front Polisaro v. Council, 2021; Joined Cases T-344/19 and T-356/19, Front
Polisario v Council, 2021.
85. Joint Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Bourita and Mr. Josep Borrell, High
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, KINGDOM OF MOROCCO MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.diplomatie.ma/en/joint-statement-mfa-nasser-bouritaand-mr-josep-borrell-high-representative-eu-foreign-affairs-and-security-policy [https://perma.cc/W3676R93].
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jurisdiction and underlining those limits. Contrary to the CACJ, it did not use
those politically sensitive cases to expand the scope of its powers. The CJEU did,
however, rule on commercial disputes arising from the background of territorial
disputes. Those usually arose in procedural contexts excluding the parties to the
actual territorial disputes. The CJEU rulings did have a significant effect on the
trade and economic rights of the population residing in the contested areas. As a
result, the CJEU rulings were subject rather to academic criticisms, but did not
trigger wider political backlash. A significant exception is the case of Western
Sahara, where the CJEU’s ruling applying international law was not aligned with
the political view represented by the EU member states in the Council. In this
context, we might be witnessing a struggle between the political and judicial
institutions over how to determine the treatment of products imported to the EU
from Western Sahara. This might even lead to some institutional disputes dealing
by proxy with the Western Sahara conflict in the future, if one of the EU member
states or institutions decided to challenge the legality of such an international
agreement.
IV
Rights-Based and Institutional Territorial Disputes by Proxy in the Practice of
the European Court of Human Rights
The ECtHR can be expected to be dealing with the rights-based type of proxy
for territorial disputes. The ECtHR clearly does not have jurisdiction to decide
over the territorial boundaries of the High Contracting parties to the Convention.
As a human-rights court, it does, however, provide broad access for individual
complaints regarding political and economic rights of the civilian population
residing in the area concerned by an international territorial conflict. The
ECtHR, in its vast case law, has dealt with many territorial and armed conflicts
and developed its own doctrine about extra-territorial application of human
rights and effective control.86 The focus of this analysis lies with the rights-based
cases arising in the context of the territorial conflict in Cyprus. This makes it
possible to examine to what extent the rights-based framing can be an effective
proxy for avoiding the mega-political nature of the dispute, on the one hand, and
stabilizing the situation of the civilian population, on the other hand.
An important procedural aspect of the ECtHR jurisdiction is the fact that the
court in Strasbourg deals mostly with individual human-rights complaints
brought by the victims after they have exhausted all the national remedies. The
ECtHR can, however, also adjudicate inter-state disputes, which tend to address
broader questions and more systemic violations.87 This part showcases how in the
case of Northern Cyprus, such inter-state proceedings are more likely to place
86. See generally Marko Milanovi and Tatjana Papic, The Applicability of the ECHR in Contested
Territories, 67 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 779 (2018).
87. See generally ISABELLA RISINI, THE INTER-STATE APPLICATION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2018).
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the court on the thin ice of mega-politics due to the setting involving the highest
representatives of both parties to a territorial dispute. While these cases still
represent a very small portion of the ECtHR’s docket, we have experienced a
rise in such applications in the recent years, leading some commentators to talk
about a “‘golden age’ of inter-state complaints.”88
A. Property Rights and Institutional Disputes Arising from the Cyprus Cases
The territorial dispute in Cyprus discussed above in Part III.B., gave rise to a
number of mega-political, rights-based TDbP before the ECtHR. The cases can
be broadly divided into two categories: individual complaints focusing on the
violation of the human right to enjoy private property, and the inter-state cases
raising a broader scope of human rights violations. Turkey has perceived both
type of cases as a “political attack” and, in its responses to the judgments,
continued to emphasize the ongoing inter-communal negotiations, questioning
the ECtHR’s legitimacy to intervene in the territorial dispute.89
The analysis here focuses on the key contentious cases before the ECtHR.
These were brought to the Court as leading cases on new questions of law. This
first relevant case to discuss in this context is the Loizidou case, in which the
Court was asked to rule on the compatibility with the Convention of the
deprivation of the applicant, Mrs. Titina Loizidou, of access to her property in
Northern Cyprus as a consequence of the Turkish occupation and to grant
compensation for the lost access to their property.90 Property is protected in the
ECHR under Art.1 of Protocol 1 of the Convention, which has been ratified by
Turkey. The specific legal question, however, reveals the politically fraught
nature of the dispute as expressed by Justice Bernhard in its dissenting opinion.
According to her: “A unique feature of the present case is that it is impossible to
separate the situation of the individual victim from a complex historical
development and a no less complex current situation.”91 The Loizidou case, in
fact, pushed the ECtHR to provide an answer as to whether Turkey was
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction with regard to Northern Cyprus; a question
which is perhaps the most contentious and debated issue of admissibility before
the Strasbourg Court.92
The ECtHR ruled separately on the substance of the legal dispute, in 1996,
confirming that Turkey had violated the right to private property by refusing Mrs.

88. Justine Batura & Lukas Kleinert, A ‘Golden Age’ of Inter-State Complaints?: An Interview with
Isabella Risini, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (Sept. 9, 2020).
89. Kudret Özersay & Ayla Gürel, The Cyprus Problem at the European Court of Human Rights, in
CYPRUS: A CONFLICT AT THE CROSSROADS 273 (Thomas Diez & Nathalie Tocci eds., 2013).
90. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513
(1996).
91. Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513 (1996) (Bernhard, J. dissenting).
92. In this regard, the ECtHR developed a test of “effective control” applied to establish when states
are responsible for violations happening outside of their territory. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589 (2011) (the Court argued that Turkey exercised direct effective
control over Northern Cyprus through its occupation by Turkish military troops).
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Loizidou and other refugees from Northern Cyprus access to their property. The
Turkish side has been critical of the Court’s engagement in the process, pointing
to the ongoing inter-communal negotiations under the auspices of the UK. They
pointed to the fact that the Turkish community of Cyprus has no standing before
the ECtHR in a case where Turkey was the respondent state.93 Such criticism
already signaled the long path to the full enforcement of the Court’s unfavorable
ruling.
The enforcement of this case is often cited as an example of the limited
success of the ECtHR.94 At first, the Turkish government was opposed to paying
the damages as a matter of principle. As published in 1999 on the website of the
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the main concerns of the Turkish
government revolved around the effects of the ruling on the de facto dormant
bilateral peace negotiations led by the UN.95 The organ responsible for
enforcement of ECtHR’s judgments is not the court itself, but the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe. This Committee has called several times on
Turkey to comply with the Loizidou ruling, exercising all the political pressure
that it has at its disposal.96 Eventually, in 2003, seven years after the judgment,
Turkey paid Loizidou compensation for temporary deprivation of access to
property, amounting to over $1 million.97 However, Loizidou did not regain
access to her property in Northern Cyprus. The actual violation of her
fundamental right to enjoy her property persisted. In 2005, the Committee of
Ministers resumed the supervision of the implementation of the merits of the case
by Turkey. In June and October 2007, the Committee “noted with concern that
to date the Turkish authorities had not made any concrete proposal to the
applicant” and urged them to adopt measures allowing the applicant to have her
property again at her disposal.98 This situation in which the respondent state pays
the compensation but does not actually cease the substantive violation of human
rights, showcases systemic problems in the enforcement of ECtHR’s judgments.99
93. Özersay, supra note 89.
94. Rick Lawson, How to Maintain and Improve Mutual Trust amongst EU Member States in Police
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters? Lessons from the Functioning of Monitoring Mechanisms
in the Council of Europe, http://hdl.handle.net/10900/66771 [https://perma.cc/XYE8-DS2Q] (2009).
95. Zaim M. Necatigil, The Loizidou Case: A Critical Examination, SAM PAPERS (Nov. 1999),
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-loizidou-case_-a-critical-examination-by-zaim-m_necatigil_-november1999.en.mfa [https://perma.cc/FEG3-76PJ].
96. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, H54-1 Loizidou Against Turkey – Judgments of
18/12/96 (merits) and 28/07/98 (just satisfaction): Interim Resolutions DH(99)680, DH(2000)105 and
ResDH(2001)80 (Oct. 15, 2003), https://rm.coe.int/16805decda [https://perma.cc/Z979-QMBL].
97. Turkey Compensates Cyprus Refugee, BBC NEWS, (Dec. 2, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3257880.stm [https://perma.cc/685E-P4KY].
98. Annual Report on the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights (2007),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55815c4fe4b077ee5306577f/t/5a380ca99140b764371bc0f7/15136227
22276/CM-annual-report-2007-en.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL9B-JVCH] [hereinafter Report].
99. Fiona de Londras & Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Mission Impossible? Addressing Non-Execution
Through Infringement Proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights, 66 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q.
472, 474 (2017).
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The Loizidou judgment was followed by a series of similar complaints,
brought by groups of applicants deprived of access to their properties in Northern
Cyprus.100 The ECtHR has relied on the same legal framing, assuming the
responsibility of Turkish authorities for the human rights violations happening
on the ground in Norther Cyprus. The pattern of compliance was also
comparable; although the victims could obtain compensation as a result of
political pressure within the Council of Europe, the violations were not actually
ceased.101
The broadest engagement of the ECtHR with the Cyprus dispute, however,
took place in the inter-state case decided by the Strasbourg Court in 2001, Cyprus
v. Turkey.102 In this case, the Cypriot government brought a case against Turkey
for human rights violations resulting from the 1974 territorial conflict. The
alleged violations can be summarized under four groups:
1. rights of Greek-Cypriot missing persons and their relatives;
2. home and property rights of displaced persons;
3. rights of enclaved Greek Cypriots in Northern Cyprus;
4. rights of Turkish Cypriots and the Gypsy community in Northern
Cyprus.
The human rights violations raised in this case clearly show that the questions
that the ECtHR was facing related not only to state sovereignty in the form of
territorial integrity and exercise of authority over certain territories, but also to
highly controversial divisions and minorities within the island’s population. The
island population included groups of different ethnicities. Part of the Cypriot
government’s allegations was that the ethnically Turkish population in the
northern part of the island occupied by Turkey was deprived of their human
rights and even human dignity due to their treatment by the occupying forces and
increased resettlement of Turkish population from the mainland.103 The fact that
the Cypriot government was standing up for the rights of not only the GreekCypriot population, but also for the Turkish population created a direct link to
internal political debates. Even though this procedure was technically an interstate dispute, the scope of arguments raised before the Court goes beyond a
dispute on the international plane. The human rights arguments involve also
taking a stance on issues highly contested on the domestic political and social
planes.
The high volume of contestation amongst the judges hearing the case shows
the political salience of the Cyprus v. Turkey case. Five personal changes
occurred on the judicial bench during this procedure. Four judges were removed
due to objections raised by the parties.104 Three Turkish judges had to be
100. See Yasa v. Turkey, App. No. 44827/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998); Djavir An v. Turkey, App. No.
20652/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003); Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
101. Report, supra note 98.
102. App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
103. Id. at ¶¶49–55.
104. Id. at ¶8.
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replaced. First, Mr. R. Türmen withdrew. Second, his replacement, Mr. S.
Dayioglu was challenged by the Cypriot government, in 1999, noting that “Mr
Dayioglu had communicated to the President his intention to withdraw from the
case.” Third, Mrs. N. Ferdi was also challenged by the Cypriot government. Two
Cypriot judges were also replaced. First, Turkey objected to Mr. L. Loucaides.
The second change was not due to the politically contested nature of the case, as
Mr. Hamilton passed away on 29 November 2000, and the Cypriot government
appointed Mr. S. Marcus-Helmons instead. In the end, the ad hoc judges
appointed in respect of Turkey and Cyprus (K. Fuad and S. Marcus-Helmons)
both wrote dissenting opinions in the case.
The highly contentious nature of the dispute was also confirmed by the fact
that the written and oral procedure before the Court happened without the
participation of the defendant state – Turkey. The arrangements for the
procedure were made by the Court’s President in consultation with the parties.105
The deadline for the submission of written memorials was set for 31 March 2000.
With a delayed letter the Turkish government requested an extension of the
deadline until 24 July 2000. In response, the President, having consulted the
Grand Chamber, extended the deadline but only until 5 June 2000. The Turkish
authorities did not submit any memorial by that deadline and did not appear at
the oral hearings in Strasbourg.106
In its 2001 decision, the ECtHR condemned Turkey for a plethora of human
rights violations relating to the situation that had existed in Cyprus since the start
of Turkey’s military operations in Northern Cyprus in July 1974. These included
the right to life and prohibition of inhumane and degrading treatment with regard
to missing persons, the right to private life and property with regard to displaced
persons, and violation of freedom of religion in respect of Maronites living in
Northern Cyprus.107 Importantly, the ECtHR did not confirm any of the alleged
violations in respect of the rights of Turkish Cypriots in Northern Cyprus. As a
result, the Court did not touch on the question that was more divisive on the
internal domestic rather than the international plane. The ruling was not received
well by the Turkish Government, which expressed its discontent in a press release
which claimed that the Court’s decision “is contrary to the realities in Cyprus,
devoid of legal basis, unjust and impossible to be implemented by Turkey.”108
As a follow up to this first ruling, in 2010 the Cypriot government submitted
an additional claim asking for damages in the name of the groups of its citizens
that had suffered from the human rights violations. This led to the 2014 judgment
of the ECtHR, by means of which the Court awarded Cyprus 30 million EUR for

105. Id. at ¶9.
106. Id. at ¶12. In its final judgment, the Court took into account the arguments that the Turkish
government had presented in its earlier pleadings before the Commission.
107. Id.
108. Press Release on the Cyprus v. Turkey Decision of the ECHR, TURKISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (May 10, 2001) http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-release-on-the-cyprus-v_-turkey-decision-of-theechr_br_may-10_-2001.en.mfa [https://perma.cc/S32C-DW5V].
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non-pecuniary damage suffered by the relatives of the missing persons and 60
million EUR for the Greek Cypriots enclaved in the Karpas peninsula.109 The
joint concurring opinion of judges Zupan i , Gyulumyan, Davíd Thór
Björgvinsson, Nicolaou, Sajó, Lazarova Trajkovska, Power Forde, Vu ini , and
Pinto de Albuquerque emphasizes the innovative nature of this ruling in terms of
enforcement of judgments of human rights courts. Although the enforcement of
ECtHR judgments is generally still in the hands of the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe, in this case the Court took a proactive role in
guaranteeing that its ruling could not be ignored on the ground. The judgment
ends, however, with a distressed note: “The Court has spoken: it remains for it to
be heard.”
The follow-up was also ensured indirectly, through individual applications.
The ECtHR has been consistent in ruling upon human rights violations resulting
from the Cyprus conflict. In its judgment on the Güzelyurtlu and others v. Cyprus
and Turkey case of January 2019, the ECtHR has found, for the first time, a
violation of Article 2 ECHR on the sole basis of Turkey’s failure to cooperate
with the Republic of Cyprus on criminal matters. This was a case brought by
individual applicants against both Cypriot and Turkish authorities.
The Loizidou v. Turkey and Cyprus v. Turkey rulings have not been fully
implemented by Turkey. The Committee of Ministers has not closed their
procedure with regard to those two judgments, which means that full
implementation has not taken place. The Committee of Ministers deals with each
of the violations separately. It has declared satisfactory certain reforms
implemented by the Turkish authorities, in particular with regard the right to
education and religious freedom of the Greek Cypriots in Northern Cyprus.110
The EU has also been contributing to the pressure on Turkey to comply with the
Strasbourg judgments. The European Commission issues a yearly round of
reports on progress of candidate countries to the EU. In its 2019 report on
Turkey, the Commission points out the non-implementation of judgments of
ECtHR as one of the serious problems in Turkey-EU relations.111 The Council,
composed of ministers from the EU member states, followed up on this criticism
in its yearly round on enlargement package, stating: “The Council notes that
Turkey continues to move further away from the European Union . . . the Council
notes that Turkey’s accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a
standstill.”112
The analysis of the cases related to the territorial dispute about Northern
Cyprus before the ECtHR illustrates the possible escalation of rights-based
109. Cyprus v. Tukey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 12, 2014).
110. Resolution Concerning the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of
Cyprus Against Turkey, CM/ResDH (2007).
111. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2019) 260 final (May 29, 2019).
112. Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilization and Association Process, COUNCIL OF
THE EU (June 18, 2019), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/18/councilconclusions-on-enlargement-and-stabilisation-and-association-process/ [https://perma.cc/R8PF-FP6Z].
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territorial disputes by proxy into a mega-political dispute. This can happen due
to several factors. The inter-state procedure provides a forum for a high-level
exchange between the two parties of the conflict. The mega-politics leads the
states to directly oppose the implementation of any judgments from the courts
relating to a particular territorial conflict. The gradual development of the case
law amounts to systemic judgments about the illegality of the occupation by one
side of the conflict, which stretches the jurisdiction competences of the ECtHR.
The ECtHR is, however, also an important case study for the strategies that
courts can deploy to avoid or slow down such an escalation. The ECtHR has
interpreted its standing rules restrictively. It has been consistent in a humanrights framing of the disputes before it and has focused on stabilizing rather than
solving the conflict.
V
THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS’ DILEMMA
The analysis conducted above provides several elements of interest to
understand what happens when ICs address mega-political issues linked to
territory. First, it underlines the important tension inherent to the ICs
adjudicating territorial disputes by proxy, perhaps more than in other instances
of ICs dealing with mega-political issues. Although the cases brought before
these ICs are, in point of law, not concerned with territory, their nature is such
that the courts cannot avoid pronouncing themselves on some aspects, if not on
the merit, of the underlying territorial dispute. This inherent tension, in turn,
allows the parties to the disputes, especially the governments on the losing side,
to de-legitimize the Courts’ intervention in regional and national political arenas,
claiming that the ICs have operated beyond their formally delegated powers. This
happened both in Central America and in Europe and constitutes an important
aspect of the adjudication of mega-political TDbP. In Central America, both the
Honduran and the Costa Rican Governments alleged that the CACJ acted ultra
vires when pronouncing on the disputes concerning the Caribbean Sea and the
Rio San Juan. In addition to this, the two Governments—especially the Costa
Rican one—have campaigned against the CACJ at the national level, using the
Court’s decisions to influence the public against the Court. Similarly, the Turkish
Government has been framing the ECtHR as an actor impeding the peace
process through inter-communal negotiations under international auspices. In
short, the case of regional courts adjudicating TDbP reveals how their
engagement is per se problematic and may be a necessary condition for
exacerbating, rather than solving, the mega-political conflict.
Beyond the jurisdictional problem, the analysis here shows that an IC’s way
of engaging with TDbP is important for avoiding negative repercussions. In
particular, the involvement of ICs in the mega-politics of territory requires the
judges to strike a balance between universal justice and the potential political
consequences of their ruling if they want to avoid triggering a backlash that
exacerbates the mega-political nature of the disputes submitted to them. This is
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revealed particularly by the comparative analysis between the Central American
and the European experiences. As described above, the two Central American
ICs did not hesitate to provide bold rulings in almost all the TDbP presented to
them. The cases between Honduras and Nicaragua largely failed to lower the
tension between the two States and the CACJ’s intervention neither stopped the
two States from threatening each other with military actions nor provided a
solution to the contested borders. The Costa Rican reaction to the CACJ’s ruling
in the case against Nicaragua also reveals the limited authority of the Court on
this matter. If the Government of Nicaragua claimed an incontestable victory,
Costa Rica refused to implement the ruling of the Court, even denouncing the
CACJ for its alleged partiality.113
In contrast, the two European courts took a more moderate path by reframing
the issues to fall squarely within their competences. The CJEU decided mostly
on the recognition of judgments and products coming from the contested
territories. The rulings on those questions provided possibilities for states to
comply with the core of the judicial rulings without “losing face” in terms of
concessions in the territorial dispute. At the same time, the rulings do stabilize
the situation and affect the state of affairs on the ground, allowing the contested
entities to export products in their own rights and benefit from the economic
profits of those exports. We can observe that most of the challenges to the
CJEU’s adjudication on the matter come from the academic debates on its
approach to the import of products from contested territories. They do become
more politically relevant as the CJEU starts developing a line of jurisprudence
applying to various territorial conflicts in one region—Palestine, Western Sahara,
and Northern Cyprus. This is one of the underlying reasons for the current standoff between the judicial and political institutions in the EU regarding import of
products from Western Sahara. Although the political institutions prefer to
differentiate their approach on a case-by-case basis, the CJEU takes more of
principled position. It remains to be seen whether and how this institutional
confrontation will unfold, but the present case study does show how the megapolitical nature of a dispute can also evolve over time and over several cases that
have a political connection. Similar considerations can be made in relation to the
ECtHR, whose jurisprudence in the Northern-Cyprus cases showcases one of the
key avoidance mechanisms that regional courts can deploy to avoid ruling on
controversial cases and limit their involvement in mega-politics, namely, a
restrictive interpretation of their admissibility requirements. The court has also
showed judicial restraint. When faced with arguments about the situation on the
ground in the conflict, the ECtHR recalls that questions of fact are to be settled
by the Commission and relies strictly on its findings.114

113. Corte Centroamericana reta a Costa Rica a probar favoritismo por Nicaragua, LA NACIÓN (Jan.
11, 2012), https://www.nacion.com/archivo/corte-centroamericana-reta-a-costa-rica-a-probarfavoritismo-por-nicaragua/O44LEMK35ZFEXLJD55WSJQ6Z6Q/story/ [https://perma.cc/RAZ34FMR].
114. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, ¶56 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1996).

CASERTA & CEBULAK (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2021]

TERRITORIAL DISPUTES BY PROXY

1/13/2022 1:25 PM

149

All of the above, in our view, shows that while it is true that the countermajoritarian role of ICs becomes extremely contested when these are seized with
issues of mega-politics, judicial intervention can still play a decisive, meaningful
role. What the case studies show is that certain ways of intervening in the megapolitics of territory are more fruitful than others. For instance, the experience of
the CACJ shows that a bold intervention, often directed to the core of the
territorial conflict, is not advisable. Like other mega-political conflicts, TDbP are
concerned with polycentric problems with many layers of complexity—social,
political, and even historical—and involving several actors with opposing
interests. Hence, a linear, bold, and frontal ruling cutting across the core of the
sensitive issues at stake may result in more harm than good. Another way to put
this is that when getting involved in mega-political TDbP, ICs would benefit from
deploying a number of judicial and extrajudicial strategies.115 These can either be
linked to the overall framing of the dispute adjudicated or aimed at containing or
slowing down the process of a judicial dispute becoming mega-political. An
obvious candidate is the well-known strategy of legal diplomacy, by means of
which ICs rule upon politically loaded cases by stating bold legal principles, but
simultaneously and carefully weigh the costs that their decisions may incur for
other actors.116 A particularly helpful form of legal diplomacy deployed by both
the CJEU and the ECtHR while ruling on TDbP consisted of giving restrictive
interpretations of the rules of standing and jurisdiction to limit the salience of the
cases brought before them. A further, and somewhat similar, technique entails
focusing on the discrete legal aspects of the broader disputes to avoid direct
embroilment with the core aspects of the case. Another crucial technique is that
of reaching out extrajudicially for relevant audiences to develop the court’s
support. This may take the form of an inter-institutional dialogue between
various regional and national organs of the organization in which the IC is
entrenched or seek to spark public deliberation around the issue to bring the
actual matter at stake to the forefront. Although this may not always be possible
due to the political and legal contexts in which the adjudication of TDbP takes
place, our comparative study of Europe and Central America points to the fact
that some form of judicial compromise must be struck when dealing with the
mega-politics of territory. For instance, this article has shown how the CJEU has
repeatedly harvested the political support for its rulings already at the moment
of their issuing by calling into cause the European Commission and, more
generally, the other institutions of the EU when facing extremely complex and
heated questions related to territory. Likewise, the CACJ has sought the support
of its regional Parliament when it foresaw that its rulings could trigger negative
governmental responses. In short, the involvement of ICs in the mega-politics of

115. See Salvatore Caserta & Pola Cebulak, Resilience Techniques of Regional Economic Courts in
Times of Crisis, 70 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 737 (2021).
116. Mikael Rask Madsen, Legal Diplomacy: Law, Politics and the Genesis of Postwar European
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A CRITICAL HISTORY (S.L.
Hoffmann ed. 2011).
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territory reveals once again the ICs’ dilemma when adjudicating highly polarizing
and controversial issues. Although tempting, bold and direct intervention is not
always recommended, as this may lead to actually worsening the cleavages
underlying the conflict that the IC was called upon to solve. At the same time,
however, ICs cannot always avoid engaging with the disputes when the stakes are
high. In this respect, it is crucial that ICs provide something that stakeholders
value and that would give them leverage to support the IC regardless of the
national or international polarization around the specific issue in point.
VI
CONCLUSION
In the twenty-first century, the global governance architecture has grown such
that a multiplicity of judicial actors can be engaged with the same territorial
dispute. They include regional economic courts, regional human rights courts, the
ICJ, and bilateral arbitration. This article has focused on regional courts, which
do not have the jurisdiction to directly decide on the territorial boundaries of the
states but deal with TDbP. The analysis focused in particular on three types of
disputes before regional courts. First, commercial disputes regarding trade and
branding of products from the contested territories are crucial for the economic
viability of any separatists’ projects. Second, rights-based disputes focusing on
individual rights are crucial for guaranteeing that the civilian population can live
in human conditions, despite the conflict. Third, institutional disputes raise the
question of delegating political responsibility of dealing with the conflict.
The territorial disputes by proxy are linked with particular procedural
arrangements before the regional courts, where cases are brought by individual
applicants or national courts. As a result, it often happens that a court would deal
with a question regarding a territorial conflict without one or both parties to that
conflict being represented in the judicial proceedings. Although it might seem
that this would negatively affect the legitimacy of such an adjudication, in practice
this arrangement allows the courts to maneuver around the potentially megapolitical nature of a dispute, which would otherwise prevent them from being
effective. It appears that what triggers the backlash is the presence of the highest
diplomatic representative of a state before an international court and the
adversary nature of proceedings. Regional courts can also adjudicate inter-state
disputes and those tend to be mega-political, even if handled by legal proxy. It is
only in those disputes that the legitimacy concern resulting from the lack of
jurisdiction of those courts over territorial disputes becomes relevant.
We conclude that it is an extremely difficult task for the regional courts to
have influence over stabilizing the civilian situation around a territorial dispute.
International adjudication has proven effective in avoiding armed conflicts and
settling territorial disputes on the international plane. International adjudication
directly dealing with territorial disputes, however, involves inter-state judicial
bodies with express competences to adjudicate upon such disputes and guarantee
both parties influence over the appointments and the procedure. Importantly,
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such inter-state adjudication is also very time consuming. Therefore, while the
territorial disputes remain unsolved, irreparable harm can happen to the
economic development and rights of the civilian population in the region. TDbP
create a possibility for international courts to affect the commercial, institutional
and human-rights situation in such conflict regions. If they manage to avoid the
mega-political framing of a dispute and guarantee the implementation of their
rulings relating to commercial issues, human rights, and institutional
competences, they could effectively improve the human security situation in a
conflict zone without directly deciding upon a territorial dispute. The analysis of
the selected case studies from the CACJ, CJEU and ECtHR, shows how difficult
this task is for regional courts. Those new-generation international courts appear
to still trigger backlash, even if they deal with the territorial disputes only by
proxy. The irreconcilable nature of a conflict can be brought up either more
immediately, by the regional court’s strategy of using highly sensitive cases as
opportunities to extend their own jurisdiction, or by the adversary nature of interstate cases. Alternatively, it can be brought up over time, as a court deals with
series of cases regarding various conflicts, which subject its jurisprudence to
political debates. Those cases of regional courts dealing with territorial disputes
by proxy show how the mega-political nature of a question is related to its
substance, and the institutional and procedural strategies of avoiding and depoliticizing those questions are clearly limited, but not entirely ineffective at
times.

